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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the district court err in determining that the UDOT notice of interest was not a
lien on Appellants' real property? Did the district court err in ruling that the notice of
interest was not a wrongful lien? Did the district court err in ruling that Appellants
cannot recover damages from UDOT? Did the district court err in finding that the State
of Utah is immune from suit? Did the district court err in dismissing Appellants' claims
based upon bona fide purchaser? Did the district court err in not addressing Appellants'
constitutional claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for review for this matter is that the appellate court should give no
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the legal conclusions reached
by the trial court for correctness. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App.
2008)

Findings of fact are set aside if they are found to be clearly erroneous by the

appellate court. See, Ockey v. Lehmer 189 P.3d 51, 59-60 (Utah 2008).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE
INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE
None.

vi

STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for valuable
consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(2)
"Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a
lien or other claim of interest in certain real property.
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(6)
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of
the real property.
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-4(1)
A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against
real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages
proximately caused by the wrongful lien.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-1
Action to determine adverse claim to property - Authorized. An action may be
brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-2
Lis pendens. In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real
property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the
defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in
such answer, or at any item afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action
or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From
the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of
the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names.
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30d-201 etseq (2006)
Due to the length of this statue it is included in Appendix 9 hereto.
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30d-301 etseq (2006)
Due to the length of this statue it is included in Appendix 9 hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When Appellants were attempting to sell their real property in Uintah, Utah during
calendar year 2006, they became informed that UDOT claimed an interest in their
property by virtue of an old condemnation order dated January 28, 1974. In furtherance
of its claim, UDOT recorded a notice of interest on the Kappos residential property on
January 19, 2006. Because the Kapposes obtained title to the subject property from was a
bona fide purchaser for value, the State had no valid claim on their property and should
not have recorded a notice of interest. The notice of interest recorded by UDOT wholly

viii

prevented them from selling their property. The purpose of this action is for Appellants
to seek damages from UDOT for its wrongful notice of interest.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The property which is the subject matter of this appeal is owned by Mark

and Mala Kappos and is located at 1577 East 6850 South, Uintah, Weber County, Utah
("the subject property"). R. 204.
2.

The subject property includes two parcels: Parcel Number 07-540-0002

(hereinafter referred sometimes as "the home lot") and 07-107-0026 (parcel behind lot
and next to Weber River hereinafter references sometimes as "the river parcel"). The
home lot and the river parcel are both owned by Appellants. R. 204-05. See also,
Appendix "1" which shows plat map generated by Weber County which demonstrate the
location of these two parcels.
3.

On or about November 15, 2005 the Kapposes listed their property for sale

with Coldwell Banker, a real estate brokerage. R. 131, Affidavit of Mala Kappos f7.
4.

UDOT recorded a notice of interest as of January 19, 2006 on both of the

above properties owed by Appellants. R. 217-18. See also Appendix "2".
5.

After attempting to sell their property, the Kapposes were informed through

an agent of UDOT that they could not sell their property because of an alleged prior
eminent domain proceeding. R. 131.
6.

At that same time the Kapposes were informed that on Januaiy 16, 2003,

the State of Utah Department of Transportation recorded a final order of condemnation

dated January 28, 1974. R. 131-32.
7.

The Kapposes became unable to sell their property to anyone because of the

notice of interest recorded by the State of Utah two months after listing their property for
sale. R. 132-33, Affidavit of Mala Kappos paragraphs 10 through 17. Also, R. 144,
Affidavit of Shauna Larsen.
8.

UDOT has failed to set forth a sufficient reason for asserting the notice of

interest on the property of the Appellants. R. 205.
9.

UDOT did not record a similar notice on any of the Appellants' neighbors

who had the same chain of title. R. 826-33 and R. 210-11.
10.

Prior to the above course of events, Appellants had purchased the home lot

from Ed Green Construction, Inc. with a recording date of August 9, 2001. R. 185,
Affidavit of Ed Green ^ 11 and R. 822.
11.

Ed Green Construction, Inc. previously acquired title to the Kappos home

lot from Edwin Higley with a recording date of June 1, 2000. R. 185, Affidavit of Ed
Green f 8, also R. 817-18.
12.

With a recording date of August 26, 2002, the Kapposes received title to

the river parcel from Ed Green. R. 185, Affidavit of Ed Green f 12 and R. 824.
13.

Ed Green previously acquired title to the river parcel from Edwin Higley

with a recording date of May 10, 2000. R. 185, Affidavit of Ed Green %9 and R. 820.
14.

Ed Green paid $175,000.00 to Edwin Higley for the purchase of the subject

parcels. R. 185-86, Affidavit of Ed Green %7, and R. 848.
15.

Ed Green had no knowledge of a prior conveyance of the subject property
X

by Edwin Higley to the State of Utah. R. 185-86, Affidavit of Ed Green ^ 15, and R. 329.
16.

The recording of the above condemnation order took place approximately

29 years after the condemnation allegedly took place. R. 220-26.
17.

As a result of the notice of interest recorded on January 19, 2006, The

Kapposes were unable to sell the property, have been unable to re-finance the property,
and have been unable to access any of their equity in the property. R. 131-32, Affidavit
of Mala Kapposffl[10-11.
18.

In March 2007, Appellants received an offer to purchase the property from

Mark and Kimberly Lyon for the amount of $740,000.00. R. 776-90.
19.

Because the Kapposes could not convey free and clear title to said

property, the sale failed to close. R. 769-70, Affidavit of Mark Kappos | f 7-9.
20.

Since the recording of the notice of interest, the fair markel value of the

property dropped drastically to $500,000.00. R. 770, Affidavit of Mark Kappos ^ 9.
21.

Appellants had planned on using some of their home equity to invest. Had

their equity been accessible to them and but for UDOT's notice of interest, they would
have realized approximately $240,000 in additional value. Instead, that has now been
lost due to the State's actions. R. 768-70, Affidavit of Mark Kappos 1JK 7-9.
22.

It was not until July 16, 2008 that the State of Utah released its notice of

interest on the property. R. 761, Withdrawal of notice of interest.

23.

Based upon the above facts, the following is a historical timeline set forth

for visual reference.
Historical Timeline
January 28
1974

February 25
1974

May 10
2000

June 1
2000

August 9
2001

August 26
2002

January 16
2003

January 19
2006

2007

Condemnation
Judgment
against Higley

Judgment
recorded
Davis
County only

Higley
Conveyance
to Green
river parcel

Higley
Conveyance
to Green
home parcel

Green
Conveyance
to Kappos
home parcel

Green
Conveyance
to Kappos
river parcel

Condemnation
Judgment
recorded in
Weber County

Notice of
Interest
recorded by
UDOT

Kapposes
sale to
Lyons fell
through

24.

Based upon the above facts, the following is the chain of title for the

respective parties:
Kappos Chain of Title (Based Upon the Home Lot)
Ed Higley to Ed Green Construction, Inc.

^

Date of Deed: June 1, 2000
Recording Date: June 1, 2000

Ed Green Construction, Inc. to Kappos
Date of Deed: August 8,2001
Recording Date: August 9,2001

UDOT's Chain of Title
Ed Higley to UDOT
Date of Order: January 19, 1974
Recording Date: January 16, 2003

SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
Because UDOT failed to timely record its interest in the subject property, it had no
valid basis to subsequently record a notice of interest regarding the Kappos property on
January 19, 2006. The district court erred in determining that the UDOT notice of
interest was not a lien on Appellants' property. The district court erred in ruling that the
xii

July
2008
Notice of 1
Interest
released by
UDOT

notice of interest was not a wrongful lien. The district court erred in ruling that
appellants cannot recover damages from UDOT. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
does not give UDOT immunity from this suit. The district court erred in granting
UDOT's motion to dismiss the appellants' quiet title bona fide purchaser claim. The
district court erred in not addressing appellants' constitutional claims.

ARGUMENT

I.

BECAUSE UDOT FAILED TO TIMELY RECORD ITS INTEREST IN
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, IT HAD NO VALID BASIS TO
SUBSEQUENTLY RECORD A NOTICE OF INTEREST ON THE
KAPPOS PROPERTY ON JANUARY 19, 2006.
The result of the above-mentioned facts was that both UDOT and Ed Green had

received conveyances from Edwin Higley for transfer of the same real property. UDOT
believed that it had acquired the subject property from Edwin Higley. Moreover, Ed
Green believed that he acquired title to the same property from Edwin Higley. Both
grantees appeared to have valid conveyances. The answer to the question of who has the
superior claim to the title of real property in this situation is answered by Utah Code
Annotated § 57-3-103 which provides as follows:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any
portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property
in good faith and for valuable consideration; and (2) the subsequent
purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
Therefore, in Utah, the grantee who records its deed first obtains paramount title if he
purchased in good faith. Based upon the above statute, there is a two part analysis.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 it should first be determined who recorded their
deed first and second it is determined whether or not the subsequent purchaser recorded
their deed in good faith.

With regard to the first question, it is undisputed that Ed Green and Ed Green
Construction, Inc. recorded their deeds prior to the recording of the condemnation
judgment in favor of UDOT. Ed Green Construction, Inc. recorded his conveyance of the
home lot which he had obtained from Ed Higley on June 1, 2000 with the Weber County
Recorder. R. 196-97. Ed Green previously acquired title from Ed Higley with regard to
the river parcel and recorded his deed on May 10, 2000. R. 199. Ed Green then conveyed
the home lot to Appellants as of a recording dated August 9, 2001 and the river parcel to
the Appellants on August 26, 2002. R. 201-03. By contrast, UDOT waited to record its
January 28, 1974 judgment that it had obtained from Ed Higley until January 16, 2003.
R. 313-32 and R. 222-26. The recording of the above condemnation order took place
approximately 29 years after the condemnation had allegedly occurred. But it is clear
that Ed Green recorded his deeds to the same property prior to the recording of any
interest which UDOT had claimed.
The next inquiry according to Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 is whether or not
the subsequent purchaser (Ed Green) purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration. Ed Green had no knowledge of any prior conveyance of the
subject property by Edwin Higley to the State of Utah. R. 185-86. A copy of the Real
Estate Purchase Contract shows the consideration paid by Ed Green to Ed Higley is a part
of the record ($175,000.00). R. 848 and R. 189-95. Interestingly, UDOT only recorded a
notice of interest on Lot 2 of the subdivision and not on any of the other lots even though
the condemnation order was recorded against those lots as well. R. 210-11. The same
situation existed for all of the lots in the subdivision because Ed Higley had conveyed a

much larger parcel through the condemnation procedure to UDOT than what was
individually conveyed to each of the lot owners in the subdivision.
It is undisputed that Ed Green paid valuable consideration for the purchase of the
property from Ed Higiey and that he had no knowledge of any alleged prior sale between
Higiey and the State of Utah. R. 185-86. As a result, he obtained bona fide purchaser
status. The overwhelming weight of authority on this issue is that once a bona fide
purchaser takes title to property he can pass it to the whole world free of the claims of the
alleged first purchaser.

See, case law from Utah's sisters states including W.W.

Planning, Inc. v. Clark, 456 P.2d 406 (Ariz. App. 1969) (ruling that a bona fide purchaser
can deliver good title to a grantee even if that grantee has notice of a prior adverse
equity); First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, 762 P.2d 379 (Wyo.
1988) (holding that a bona fide purchaser may sell or convey property to persons who
will then receive protections as a bona fide purchaser.); Sun Valley Land and Minerals,
Inc. v. Burt, 853 P.2d 607 (Idaho App. 1993) (one who purchases with knowledge of a
defect enjoys the same protection as the person from whom he purchased the property);
Bailey v. Butner, 176 P.2d 226 (Nev. 1947) (finding that a subsequent purchaser from a
bona fide purchaser enjoys bona fide purchaser protection status). See also, Summary of
Utah Real Property Law, vol. 1, page 87, § 2.42 (BYU 1978). Thus, the Kapposes
obtained title to the subject property from a bona fide purchaser, Ed Green.
Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah never had a claim to the subject
properties after Ed Green recorded his deeds from Ed Higiey on May 10, 2000 and June
1, 2000 because UDOT failed to record its 1974 condemnation order in Weber County

prior to the recording of the property sales to Ed Green and Ed Green Construction, Inc.,
in the year 2000. Therefore, UDOT has no claim whatsoever to the subject property.
UDOT lost that claim when Ed Higiey recorded his deeds in May 2000 and June 2000
respectively.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
UDOT NOTICE OF INTEREST WAS NOT A LIEN ON APPELLANTS'
PROPERTY.
Appellants presented the above issues to the District Court by way of a motion for

partial summary judgment. At the same time, the District Court considered UDOT's
motion to dismiss. On or about June 15, 2007 the Second District Court issued a ruling
entitled Ruling, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. 328-42 (which is also attached hereto as Appendix 3). The District Court
set out elements to qualify for relief under the wrongful lien statute stating that a property
owner must show that, "(a) the document at issue purports to create a lien or
encumbrance; (b) the lien was "wrongful" as defined by the Act; and (c) the lien the
wrongful at the time it was filed." R. 332.
"The documents that were filed in this case do not purport to
establish a lien or encumbrance as defined by the wrongful lien
statutes. A lien is defined as "a legal right or interest that a creditor
has in another property lasting usually until a debt or duty that it
secures is satisfied." Black's Law Dictionary 941(7* Ed. 2004). An
encumbrance is defined as "any interest in a third person consistent
with a title in fee in the grantee, if such outstanding interest
injuriously affects the value of the property." Hancock v. Planned
Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1990). UDOT does not allege
that it is a creditor, and it asserts an ownership interest in the
property - an interest which is inconsistent with title in fee in the
grantee. Therefore, UDOT has not filed a lien or encumbrance." R.
332-33.

In summary, the District Court concluded that the notice of interest recorded by UDOT
on Appellants' property was not a lien or encumbrance.
The standard of review which the Court should use in determining whether or not
the District Court's legal conclusion on this issue is appropriate is the correctness
standard. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App. 2008). The above case sets
forth that the appellate court should give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of
law and review the legal conclusions reached by the trial court for correctness. The legal
conclusion that UDOT's notice of interest is not a lien or encumbrance is completely
incorrect. The language of the notice of interest recorded by UDOT is "the undersigned,
Utah Department of Transportation, State of Utah, does hereby assert and claim an
interest in and to the following described property: [Both of Appellants parcels]." See,
Appendix 2. The State of Utah had already recorded its Order of Condemnation on
January 16, 2003 and therefore the recording of the notice of interest went outside the
scope of the recording of the Order of Condemnation.

Moreover, the effect of the

recording of the notice of interest by UDOT defeated Appellants' attempts to sell the
subject property. R. 132-33, R. 144, and R. 369-70.
As a result of the notice of interest recorded by UDOT, the Kapposes could not
sell their property, could not access the equity in their property and could not do anything
whatsoever with the title thereto. The State of Utah should not be engaging in this type
of conduct - recording baseless notices of interest on property of its citizens. The
conduct of the State of Utah to record a notice of interest when UDOT had lost any rights

of the property whatsoever pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 is blatantly
wrong. UDOT knew what it was doing when it recorded the notice of interest on the
Appellants' property and clearly made the calculated decision to record it only against the
Appellants' property and not against any other property of any other lot owner in the
same subdivision who had the same chain of title. R. 210-11. The conduct was
specifically targeted at Appellants and has no basis whatsoever. Although all of the other
owners identified on the plat Appendix 1 had the same chain of title through Ed Higley
and Ed Green, UDOT did not record a notice of interest on their properties-just the
Kapposes. R. 826-33. Any analysis of the situation would show that UDOT had lost any
claim to the subject property by failing to record earlier than Ed Green's deeds from Ed
Higley. Moreover, the statutory and case law concerning bona fide purchaser status is
abundantly clear on this issue and UDOT should not have engaged in this conduct by
virtue thereof.
The District Court made a legal determination that the notice of interest did not
constitute a lien or encumbrance. This legal conclusion is erroneous and this Court
should correct that legal conclusion and direct the District Court to find that the notice of
interest was a lien or encumbrance recorded by UDOT against the Appellants' property.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NOTICE OF
INTEREST WAS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN.

The notice of interest was clearly intended by the State of Utah to prevent
Appellants from selling their property or doing anything with it.

That result was

achieved by UDOT in preventing Appellants from selling their property. R. 769-70.

Because the final condemnation order of January 19, 1974 is of no effect as to the subject
properties owned by the Kapposes, the notice of interest upon which the final
condemnation order is based, is a wrongful lien. A notice of interest is in violation of
Utah law. See, Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Utah App. 2000).
In Russell, the parties entered into a contract requiring the buyer to pay the seller
more than $500,000.00 for its interest in real property which included payment of certain
amounts for lots to be developed and that a note would be secured by a trust deed and
trust deed note to be recorded after closing of the construction loan and escrow
arrangements were made. At no time did the real property owner in Russell convey to
the lien claimant an interest in any of the lots. Notwithstanding, the claimant filed a
notice of interest with the county recorder and the property owner filed a petition to clear
title arguing that the Defendants had no legitimate legal claim to an interest in the
properties and no contractual or legal right to file a so called "notice of interest". The
Russell court agreed with the property owner and the issue went up on appeal. The Court
of Appeals noted that the trial court engaged in summary proceedings as provided an
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et seq. The court stated "to file a notice of interest the
person must minimally claim to have an interest in the land." Id. at 1247. The Russell
court further stated that in order to determine whether a document conveys an interest in
land, the court should look at the agreement between the parties. The court found that the
agreement in question did not purport to convey an interest in land but was nothing more
than a promise to do so at a later time. The appellate court concluded that the Defendants
did not have an interest in the property, that the notice of interest could not be authorized

under Utah Code Annotated § 57-9-4, and was therefore not exempted from the wrongful
lien definition. Accordingly, the Russell court found that the notice of interest was a
wrongful lien and that the Plaintiff was entitled to summary relief pursuant to the Utah
Code Annotated § 38-9-7.
Similarly in this case, there are no grounds for a notice of interest being recorded
on the Kappos property and said document constitutes a wrongful lien under Utah Code
Annotated § 38-9-1 and § 38-9-4. The order of condemnation was recorded
approximately 29 years late and did not grant any rights to the State of Utah by virtue of
its being recorded after a recording by a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the real
property. Moreover, because the notice of interest is based upon the 1974 condemnation
order, it violates Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103. Based upon the foregoing, the notice
of interest recorded by the State of Utah Department of Transportation on January 19,
2006 was clearly a wrongful lien. Appellaints should be entitled to recover all of their
damages under the wrongful lien section of Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et seq.
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 as it existed at the time of the Court's decision
states, "wrongful lien" means:
"Any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on a
owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded
or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another
state of federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c)
signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner
of the real property."1

1 It is interesting to note that Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(6) has since been amended to include the term "notice
of interest" as a wrongful lien.

While it may have been appropriate to record the Condemnation Order, it was completely
illegal for UDOT to record the notice of interest because it did not meet any of these
requirements. It is not expressly authorized by any statute. Moreover, the notice of
interest is not authorized or contained in an order or judgment of a court of a competent
jurisdiction especially given the fact that the judgment had already been recorded in
2003. Finally, the notice of interest was not authorized by Appellants Mark and Mala
Kappos. Therefore, the Court should remand this case to the Judicial District Court
instructing the court to find that the notice of interest was a wrongful lien.
The District Court made a legal determination that the notice of interest was not
wrongful. This conclusion is erroneous and this Court should apply the standard of
reviewing that conclusion for correctness set forth in the Kenny v. Rich case. This Court
should direct the District Court to correct its erroneous legal conclusion and make a
determination that the notice of interest recorded by UDOT was wrongful and that
damages should be awarded under the wrongful lien statute. Utah Code Annotated § 389-1 etseq.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANTS
CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FROM UDOT.

The District Court ruled that Appellants cannot recover damages from UDOT. R.
482-83. The standard of review with regard to this question is also that the Appellate
Court should give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and should review
the legal conclusions reached by the trial court for correctness. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186
P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App. 2008).

Appellants relied upon Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 et seq. to claim damages as
against UDOT.

The District Court cited to the quiet title sections of Utah Code

Annotated § 78-40-1 through 13 (1987) in determining that no monetary damages could
be recovered by Appellants. R. 335. However, Appellants did not rely upon the quiet title
statute to claim damages, rather Appellants were relying upon the wrongful lien statute of
38-9-1 et seq. to recover damages as against UDOT. The wrongful lien statute does
authorize damages and does not exclude the State of Utah. Thus, the District Court
discounted the wrongful lien statute when making this ruling.
Moreover, the District Court cited another case in refusing to grant damages. See,
Jack Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). That case does not stand
for the proposition that Appellants cannot obtain damages. This matter is distinguished
from the Nield case because in this case UDOT clearly lost its right to claim any title to
the property by failing to record its condemnation order in a timely manner. In the Nield
case, a seller brought a quiet title action against a purchaser's assignee relating to a real
estate purchase contract.

The court eventually decided that damages could not be

allowed in that action because quiet title actions do not include any remedies for refusing
to release title. But the wrongful lien statute was not discussed in that case because it had
no been enacted at the time of the facts at hand. Id. at 1134 fh.l. The Kapposes have
invoked the wrongful lien statute and have asked the court for damages in addition to
attempting to quiet title. Because Appellants asked the District Court to interpret the
wrongful lien statute, the court cannot rely upon the quiet title statute to defeat their
claims under the wrongful lien statute. Moreover, the District Court should not have

dismissed Appellants' slander of title and defamation claims. R. 162 for the same
reasons.
UDOT's notice of interest is the direct cause of damages to Appellants. When
UDOT recorded its Condemnation Order it was basically meaningless because it was
obvious to all title searchers that it had been recorded late. But when UDOT determined
that it was not successful in asserting its claim pursuant to the Condemnation Order, it
went one step further and recorded the notice of interest on the Kappos property only.
This conduct was wrongful and caused the Appellants significant damages including the
loss of a valuable sale of their home. This Court should recognize the damages suffered
by the Appellants and direct the District Court to make a determination as to the amount
of those damages.
V.

THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT GIVE
UDOT IMMUNITY FROM THIS SUIT.
The District Court also erred in determining that the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act does not allow Appellants to obtain damages against UDOT.

R. 482-83.

"[IJmmunity is an affirmative defense which the defendant bears the burden of proving."
Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 754, 760 (Utah App. 1999). The Utah Governmental
Immunity Act does not prevent claims for quiet title actions.

See. Houghton v.

Department of Health. 125 P.3d 860 (Utah 2005).
The District Court concluded that UDOT has not waived its immunity for
damages. R. 483. On the contrary, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30d-301(2) states that,
"immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived... (b) as to any action brought

to foreclose mortgages or other liens and real or personal property, to determine any
adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal
property." This action clearly deals with a claim of a governmental entity on private real
property. Thus, although the court concluded that the State of Utah is immune from this
lawsuit the result which it obtained was incorrect.
The District Court further stated that the Supreme Court of Utah case of Tindlev v.
Salt Lake City School District 116 P.3d 295 (Utah 2005) is dispositive and that UDOT
by recording a notice of interest was engaged in a governmental function. Appellants
disagree with this conclusion because in the Tindlev case the Supreme Court of Utah
dealt with whether or not the Utah legislature could place a cap on damages in a situation
where high school students were injured or killed in an automobile accident occurring on
a return trip from out of state on an extracurricular activity. The Tindlev case only
addressed the constitutionality of governmental immunity and did not discuss specific
waivers and non-waivers of governmental immunity.
The District Court stated that UDOT's actions of recording the notice of interest
were within its governmental function. R. 483. But this conclusion is in error.
Governmental immunity is not waived if the claim arises from a
discretionary function, but governmental immunity is waived if the
claim arises from an operational function. See, Johnson v. UDOT,
133 P.3d 402, 407 (Utah 2006). The case law suggests that a
discretionary function is made at the policy making level not at the
operational level. See, Johnson v. UDOT, 133 P.3d 402, 407 (Utah
2006).

The discretionary function exception to waiver of governmental immunity from suit for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed from
the scope of employment is limited to broad policy decisions requiring evaluation of
basic governmental policy matters, not operational administrative acts. See, Health Care
Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health, 40 P.3d 591, 598-99 (Utah 2002).
There are many Utah cases which address the distinction between operational and
discretionary functions. For instance, the design, capacity and construction of a city-wide
drainage system was within the discretionary function exception to the Governmental
Immunity Act. See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) (finding that the design of a drainage system is a discretionary
function but that decisions relating to operation and maintenance of the system may not
have been made on the policy level and that the case should be remanded for factual
determination).
In Sandberg v. Lehman, 76 P.3d 699 (Utah App. 2003) the court dealt with the
issue as to whether or not immunity would be allowed relating to the design and
operation of a landfill. The parties agreed that the design and operation of the landfill
was a governmental function but disagreed as to whether the discretionary function
except of the Governmental Immunity Act applied to the facts of the case. The court
stated that discretionary function immunity is a distinct and limited form of immunity
that should be applied only when a plaintiff is challenging a governmental decision that
involves a basic policy-making function. Id. at 702. In Sandberg the court concluded
that the decisions leading to omission of safety features at a concrete pit were not the

result of policy evaluation, judgment and expertise and further declined to extend the
discretionary function immunity to those facts. Id. at 709.
Discretionary function immunity should be confined to those decisions and acts
occurring at the basic policy-making level and not extended to those acts and decisions
taking place at the operational level. See, Carroll v. State Road Commission. 496 P.2d
888, 891 (Utah 1972). The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that a government entity's
policy-based decisions which are entitled to discretionary function immunity as
distinguished with those that occur at the operational level are important to differentiate
because "not every governmental action involving discretion is a discretionary function
within the meaning of the Act." See, Trujillo, 986 P.2d 752, 758 (Utah App. 1999).
Otherwise, "the exception would swallow the rule as almost all governmental decisions
involve some discretion." Id.

The decisions which are entitled to immunity are

characterized "by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing
alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning." See,
Keegan v. State. 896 P.2d 618, 625 (Utah 1995). Operational level decisions "concern
routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors." Id- at 623.
A good illustration of this analysis is found in Johnson v. UDOT. 133 P.3d 402
(Utah 2006). In that case, the court determined that the Department of Transportation's
use of orange plastic barrels on highway construction project did not qualify for the
discretionary exception to the waiver of governmental immunity under the Governmental
Immunity Act.

"While the judiciary strives not to interfere with governmental

deliberations addressed by the political process, the government cannot escape liability

by simply claiming that some discretion, however minimal, was used in making a
decision." Id "The key... is that the government actually exercises a level of discretion
in a manner that implicates policymaking and thrusts the decision into the political
process." Id.
In this case, the recording of UDOT's notice of interest on the Kappos real
property was not a governmental policy, but an operational administrative act carelessly
and negligently targeting the Appellants. This Court should find that governmental
immunity does not apply to these facts.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING UDOT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS THE APPELLANTS5 QUIET TITLE BONA FIDE
PURCHASER CLAIM,

UDOT recognized that its notice of interest had no valid basis and eventually
released the notice of interest on its own volition on July 16, 2008 by recording its
withdrawal of notice of interest concerning the subject property. R. 744. With that act as
its sole basis and in re-arguing all of the issues pertaining to Utah Code Annotated § 573-103, UDOT asked the District Court to dismiss Appellants' claim for quieting title to
the property. While Appellants are appreciative that the State of Utah has released its
notice of interest and that it did so voluntarily, such conduct only begs the question of
whether or not damages should have been awarded. The District Court determined that
no damages could be awarded and therefore rejected Appellants' arguments that although
the release of notice of interest had quieted title to the property, still did not address the
damages which UDOT had caused the Kappos family. R. 768-70. The Kappos family

suffered a great deal as a result of the recording of the notice of interest by UDOT which
was wrongful from its inception. The Kapposes had intended to move their family to a
new location, downsize their home and send their children to different schools. R. 76870. The Kapposes had decided that moving to a new location would be better for their
family. However, they could not sell their property and the sale of their property was
actually defeated because of the notice of interest. R. 769-70. In addition, the Kapposes
could not access any equity in their property during the extended period that the notice of
interest was on the property. Moreover, the value of the property has; significantly
dropped since the sale of the property which the Kapposes lost as a result of the notice of
interest. R. 770. Most importantly, the Appellants lost an actual buyer of their property
at a price of $740,000.00. R. 769-70. The damages to the Kapposes as a result of
UDOT's actions are significant and have been completely discounted and overlooked by
the District Court.

This Court should review that decision and make a legal

determination that the District Court erred in reaching that conclusion. Damages in this
situation should be allowed.
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS.

ADDRESSING

The District Court originally allowed Appellants to amend their complaint to
allege constitutional issues. R. 526-27. However, by way of an order dated November 3,
2008 the court dismissed Appellants constitutional takings claim, based on both the
United States and Utah Constitutions without prejudice. R. 653-55. Later, after other
issues in the case were resolved which are not being appealed, Appellants asked the court

to reinstate the constitutional takings claim. In its decision filed March 1, 2010, the court
determined that it would not reinstate Appellants' claim for constitutional taking even
though it had been dismissed without prejudice. The court authorized Appellants to file a
separate complaint to proceed with the constitutional takings claim. R. 1044-45. In a
prior decision recorded October 27, 2009, while addressing UDOT's motion to dismiss
the constitutional claim with prejudice, the District Court stated:
Admittedly, the Court's prior Ruling on the Plaintiffs' Constitutional
Taking Claims is ambiguous. But so were the Plaintiffs' initial
pleadings. With very little help in analysis, from the Plaintiffs in
regards to their claims, the court was left to guess as to the Plaintiffs'
theories of recovery. The court, guessing that the issue of mistake
might in some way shape or form be part of the Plaintiffs'
constitutional taking claim, dismissed that claim without prejudice.
It was anticipated by the, the Court, that the Plaintiffs would file an
amended complaint clarifying their claim or theory of recover. The
Plaintiffs did file an amended complaint clarifying their
Constitutional Takings Claim. The issues raised by the Plaintiffs in
their amended complaint and in their response to the Defendant's
motion as sufficient to deny the Defendant's motion. R. 997.
The court clearly felt that there was merit to Appellants' constitutional takings claim but
refused to address it. The constitutional takings claim should have been addressed by the
District Court in order to proceed on the basis of judicial economy rather than requiring a
whole new lawsuit be filed when the judge was already familiar with the facts of the case.
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court erred in not addressing Appellants'
constitutional takings claims.

CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in making numerous legal determinations which
prevented Appellants from recovering damages from UDOT for its wrongful notice of
interest. The wrongful notice of interest caused the Appellants significant harm for the
period of time that it was hindering title to their property. Therefore, this Court should
reverse the rulings of the District Court, allow Appellants to recover damages and direct
the District Court to determine the amount of those damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j 2 g^day of October, 2010.
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.

M. Darin Hammond
Attorneys for Appellants Mark and Mala Kappos

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing OPENING
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were mailed by first-class mail with postage fully prepaid
this Qkfcft day of October, 2010, to each of the following:
Nancy L. Kemp
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
Civil Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Legal Assistant
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NOTICE OF INTEREST
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MARK KAPPOS and MALA KAPPOS,

Mis

Plamtiffs,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,

RULING, DEFENDANT'S^
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 060902775
Judge W. Brent West

Defendant.

»
<n
>

In this quiet title action, the Defendant, the Utah Department of Transportation (UD(^),
has moved to dismiss all the Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the Plaintiffs have failed to comply
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA). Additionally, the Plaintiffs have moved for
partial summary judgment, arguing that UDOT must release its notice of claim on their property.
The Court will dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' remaining claims without prejudice except for the
Plaintiffs' claim which seeks to quiet title due to a mistake in the condemnation order. The
Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
In 1974, UDOT obtained an order condemning Plaintiffs' properly (Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Exhibit F), but it failed to record it m the appropriate county, Weber, for approximately 30 years.
During this delay, Edwin Higley (the owner of the disputed property at the time UDOT
condemned it), sold the same land, in at least two parcels-one to Ed Green Constmction Inc., and
one to Ed Green individually. (Affidavit of Ed Green, Exhibits B & C). Mr. Green has stated,
DECISION - COURT DENIES THE PLAILNTIFFS' MOTIOI

and UDOT does not contest, that he knew nothing of UDOT's condemnation order, and he paid
valuable consideration for both parcels of property. (Affidavit of Ed Green, Page 2,fflf7 & 15).
The Plaintiffs purchased these two parcels in 2001 and 2002, and they immediately recorded
their deeds. (Affidavit of Ed Green, Exhibits D & E).
UDOT recorded the condemnation order on January 14,2003, and then, it filed a notice
of interest on the Plaintiffs' property on January 19,2006, (Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibits B & C). Subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed a petition to nullify UDOT's
documents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, et. seq (Wrongful Lien Statutes). (Petition,
Case Number 060901882). The Honorable Michael D. Lyon ruled that the Plaintiffs did not
qualify for relief under these provisions, because (a) at the time the UDOT filed its notice it was
not wrongful; and (b) determining priority of title (between bona fide purchasers for value and
title based on a condemnation order) is prohibited by the Wrongful Lien Statutes. (Order Dated
May 8, 2006; 1f1f 17 & 18).
As a result of this Order, the Plaintiffs filed this separate suit which included claims for
(1) quiet title; (2) slander of title; and (3) defamation of title. (Complaint, Case Number
060902775). The Plaintiffs' complaint provided aletemate bases for their quiet title claim-(a)
Plaintiffs' title was superior to UDOT's due to their status as bona fide purchasers for value and
(b) the condemnation order mistakenly included the description of the disputed property when
another property was intended for inclusion. Id. UDOT filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
(1) the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
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Immunity Act (UGIA), and (2) Plaintiffs' claims of slander and defamation of title were barred
by UGIA. The Court entered an order dismissing the Plaintiffs' slander and defamation of title
claims, because they are barred by the UGIA.
However, the Court was unable to rule on the Plaintiffs' remaining claim(s)-quiet title,
because it was unclear what the Plaintiffs were actually claiming. In the Plaintiffs' complaint,
they sought monetary damages as a remedy to their quiet title claim-a remedy which is highly
unusual in a quiet title claim. (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Page 8 t41). The Court's extensive
research failed to uncover one case where a court awarded monetary damages pursuant to a quiet
title cause of action. After reviewing the documentation in this case, it was apparent that the
Plaintiffs were alleging that their damages were caused by UDOT's filing of the abovereferenced documents-not by its claim to the property. (Affidavit of Mala Kappos, Pages 2-3, ^[
10, 11, 13, & 14). Since the Court had not been informed of the Plaintiffs' previous petition to
nullify a wrongful lien, this indicated that the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim was actually a hybrid of
two different claims-one for wrongful lien and one for quieting title.
The proper characterization of these claims (as a traditional quiet title, wrongful lien, or
something else) was important, because equitable claims are exempt from the requirements of the
UGIA, but legal claims are not. Without a proper understanding of the Plaintiffs' claim(s), the
Court could not characterize the claim(s) as legal or equitable. Therefore, the Court could not
conclude whether the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim was subject to the requirements of the UGIA-a
conclusion that was necessary to rule on UDOT's motion to dismiss.
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To do substantial justice, the Court requested that the Plaintiffs specify what cause(s) of
action they were pursuing or to inform the Court that they needed more time for discovery. The
Plaintiffs told the Court that they needed more time for discovery (Plaintiffs' Request to
Complete Discovery), but subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
asking the Court to have UDOT remove its notice of interest-essentially, an action under the
Wrongful Lien Statutes.
In the hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs would not
specify which claims they were making, and UDOT renewed its motion to dismiss. Due to these
unusual circumstances, the Court will discuss the relationship between quiet title and wrongful
lien actions, characterize the Plaintiffs' remaining quiet title claim(s), ascertain whether the
Plaintiffs have stated claim(s) for which relief can be granted, and determine whether the
Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed due to the failure to comply with the notice requirements
oftheUGIA.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUIET TITLE AND WRONGFUL LIENS-THE
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
Quiet title actions are used to resolve disputes in which a party asserts an ownership
interest in property which is invalid, or, it is used to determine which of two parties has superior
title when more than one party has a valid claim to ownership. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina fin re
Hoopiiaina Trust), 144 P.3d 1129,1137 (Utah 2006). Quiet title actions can also be used to
remove a wrongful lien or encumbrance. Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., L.L.C.. 123 P.3d 393 (Utah
2005).
However, property owners who seek to remove a wrongful lien or encumbrance, may
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have a second option-a petition under the Wrongful Lien Statutes. In the Wrongful Lien
Statutes, the legislature has provided for an expedited procedure to resolve wrongful
liens/encumbrances if certain requirements are met. One of the most important of these
requirements is that the wrongful lien or encumbrance asserted by the plaintiff must meet the
definition of wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Statutes-a definition which is much stricter than
under traditional property law. If these requirements are not met, the party must pursue relief
under traditional quiet title principles.
Using this understanding of quiet title principles, relying on its previous observations, and
the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court will construe the Plaintiffs' remaining
quiet title claim as four different causes of action: (1) a wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien
Statutes, (2) quiet title due to a wrongful lien, (3) quiet title as UDOT's ownership claim is based
on a mistake in the order of condemnation, and (4) quiet title due to the superiority of the
Plaintiffs' title under the legal concept of a bona fide purchaser for value.
WRONGFUL LIEN PURSUANT TO THE WRONGFUL LIEN ACT
The Plaintiffs' claim for a wrongful lien pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statutes fails to
state a claim for which relief can be granted. To qualify for relief under the Wrongful Lien
Statutes, a property owner must show that (a) the document at issue purports to create a lien or
encumbrance; (b) the lien was "wrongful" as defined by the Act; and (c) the lien was wrongful at
the time it was filed. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7. The Plaintiffs' claim fails to met any of these
requirements.
The documents that were filed in this case do not purport to establish a lien or
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encumbrance as defined by the Wrongful Lien Statutes. A lien is defined as u a legal right or
interest that a creditor has in another's property lasting usually until a debt or duty that it secures
is satisfied." Black's Law Dictionary 941 (7th ed. 2004). An encumbrance is defined as "any
interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee in the grantee, if such outstanding interest
injuriously affects the value of the property." Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186
(Utah 1990). UDOT does not allege that it is a creditor, and it asserts an ownership interest in
the property-an interest which is inconsistent with title in fee in the grantee. Therefore, UDOT
has not filed a lien or encumbrance.
Even if UDOT had been asserting a lien/encumbrance, it would not have been wrongful
under the Wrongful Lien Statues. The Act states that a lien is not wrongful if it was authorized
by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state. Utah
Code Ann. §38-9-l(6)(b). Since the condemnation order authorized UDOT to take the property,
it is not wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Statutes.
The Plaintiffs cannot show that UDOT's documents were wrongful at the time they were
recorded. The Plaintiffs have asserted that UDOT's condemnation order and its notice of interest
were wrongful at the time they were filed, because by the time these documents were recorded
the Plaintiffs' title to the property was superior to UDOTs under the legal concept of bona fide
purchaser for value. Under Utah Code Ann. §57-3-103 a party that fails to record a document
which conveys property to it, risks losing its claim to that property if (a) the original owner sells
the same property to a second party; (b) the second party purchased the property in good faith; (c)
the second party paid valuable consideration for the property; and (d) the second party records its
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deed before the first buyer. While the Plaintiffs may eventually be able to prove that they are
bona fide purchasers for value, they had not done so when UDOT filed its documents. At this
time (and at the time UDOT filed) it is plausible that the Plaintiffs will not be able to establish
that they are bona fide purchasers for value-rendering their claim to the property invalid.
Therefore, UDOT's recording was not wrongful at the time it filed.
Since the Plaintiffs' claim does not meet any of the requirements for relief under the
Wrongful Lien Statutes, their claim under the Wrongful Lien Statutes fails to state a claim for
relief.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR QUIET TITLE DUE TO A WRONGFUL LIEN
The documents recorded in this case are not liens or encumbrances. (See discussion
supra, Wrongful Lien Pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, ^ 3). Therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim
for quiet title due to a wrongful lien fails to state a claim for relief.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR QUIET TITLE DUE TO A MISTAKE IN THE ORDER
CONDEMNING PROPERTY AND SUPERIORITY OF PLAINTIFFS5 TITLE
The Plaintiffs have stated claims for relief in their claim for quieting title due to a mistake
in the order condemning the property and their claim that their title is superior due to the legal
concept of bona fide purchasers for value. However, the Plaintiffs may not request monetary
damages as a part of these claims.
Since the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim included an unusual request for monetary damages
as a remedy, one of the pivotal issues in this case, is whether traditional quiet title principles
allow a plaintiff to recover monetary damages. The Court concludes that a plaintiff may not
receive monetary damages for a traditional quiet title cause of action. Rather, if a plaintiff in a
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quiet title action seeks damages, he/she must plead and prove an additional cause of action which
authorizes damages as a remedy.
The plain language of the statutes which authorize a quiet title action and the case of Jack
B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988) support this conclusion. In Nield, the
defendant provided money for a company's down payment on a land sales contract in which
plaintiff was the seller. In exchange, the defendant received an assignment of the company's
rights in the real estate contract-an assignment he recorded. When the company defaulted, the
defendant refused to redeem the property or release his assignment, as the plaintiff requested, for
approximately eight months. This refusal resulted in financial damage to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff filed suit claiming a cause of action in quiet title and one in wrongful refusal to cleanse
title, hi overturning the trial court's award for damages for wrongful refusal to cleanse title, the
Nield court stated; "[tjhere is no basis in law for this award. Quiet title actions are statutory in
nature, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-40-1 through -13 (1987), authorizing quiet title actions, does
not include any remedies for refusing to release title." Id- at 1133 (internal citations omitted).
Further, the Nield court explained that at common law, there was no action for refusal to cleanse
title. "This Court held that there was no affirmative duty to release the lien and that 'at the
common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or
discharge a lien or claim against property.'" Id. at 1134 (internal citations omitted).
A review of the current statute shows that it still does not include a remedy for refusing to
release title-only for the wrongful withholding of property. Based on the plain language of the
current statute and the language in Nield, the Court concludes that a plaintiff is not allowed to
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recover monetary damages in a quiet title action, nor are they allowed to recover monetary
damages for a cause of action which is similar to wrongful refusal to cleanse title.
The Nield case closely parallels this action-the Plaintiffs, in this case, seek an order
quieting title in the land and damages for UDOT's refusal to release its recorded documents. As
in Nield, the party clouding title, UDOT, originally had the authority to file its documents which
clouded the property owner's title. (See discussion supra. Wrongful Lien Pursuant to the
Wrongful Lien Act f 5). The Plaintiffs, in this case, also requested that UDOT release title, but
UDOT refused. (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Page 6, f 32). According to the Plaintiffs affidavit, the
monetary damages incurred by the Plaintiffs resulted from this refusal-not from UDOT's claim.
(Affidavit of Mala Kappos, Pages 2-3,ffi[10, 11, 13, & 14). While the Plaintiffs have not alleged
a separate cause of action such as wrongful refusal to cleanse title, their request for damages is
essentially the same as the wrongful refusal to release damages in Nield-they are alleging the
same type of damages and asking for compensation. Since Nield has prohibited claims which are
similar to the wrongful refusal to release filed documents, the Plaintiffs' request for monetary
damages is not allowed. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' may not request monetary damages as a part
of their quiet title action.
PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH UGIA'S NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
UDOT has argued that, even if the Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief, the Plaintiffs'
failure to comply with the UGIA's notice requirements should result in a dismissal, because
failure to comply with the UGIA's notice requirements divests the Court of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs have argued that their quiet title claim is an equitable claim which is
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not subject to the UGIA's notice requirements, but they also assert that they gave notice.
Equitable claims are exempt from UGIA's notice requirements. American Tierra Corp. v.
West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1992). However, if a claim is subject to the UGIA, failure
to strictly comply with the UGIA's notice requirements divests a court of subject matter
jurisdiction over a plaintiffs claim(s). Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr.. 147 P.3d 390, 399
(Utah 2006). Therefore, the Court must determine whether a quiet title claim is legal or
equitable.1
As construed earlier, the Plaintiffs have stated two different "quiet title" actions. The first
alleges that UDOT should never have received title to the property, because the condemnation
order mistakenly included the description of the disputed property when a different property
should have been included. The second alleges that the Plaintiffs have superior title to UDOT,
because they are bona fide purchasers for value. These are two different cause of action. In
Nolan v Hoopiiaina (In Re Hoopiiaina Trust), the Supreme Court of Utah distinguished between
"true quiet title actions" which seek to perfect a party's title against adverse claims and other
quiet title actions which seek the remedy of quieting title, but do so on the basis other than the
perfection of title from an adverse claim, i.e., fraud, mistake, accident, etc. 144 P.3d 1129, 113538 (Utah 2006). The Plaintiffs' claim that they are bona fide purchasers for value is a true quiet
title action, and their claim that there was a mistake in the judgment is a not true quiet title
action-it is an action to reform a judgment based on a mistake.

1

The Court recognizes that the Plaintiffs' complaint also stated claims for slander and defamation of
title-claims that were dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. While UDOT's motion
to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs' failure to follow the notice of claim requirements could apply to these claims, the
Court will not address its applicability, because these claims have already been dismissed.
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Plaintiffs' claim that there was mistake in the judgment is an equitable action. Mistake in
a judgment or order due to a "mistake of fact or false assumption may be grounds for relief under
rule 60(b)(7) or pursuant to an independent action in equity regardless of the length of time that
has passed." Gillmor v. Wright. 850 P.2d 431,435 (Utah 1993) (Internal Quotation Omitted).
Here, the Plaintiffs have filed a separate action. It is one in equity. Therefore, it is exempt from
the UGIA's notice requirements.
However, the Plaintiffs' claim that they are bona fide purchasers for value is a legal
claim. In Holland v Wilson. 327 P.2d 250 (Utah 1958), the Supreme Court of Utah decided that
a party in a quiet title action is entitled to a jury, because quiet title claims are legal. "This court
has already held that an action to quiet title is an action at law and either side upon request is
entitled to a jury trial." Id at 251. The Court continued;

We are further of the opinion that although historically an action to quiet title was
originally equitable and the law courts had no jurisdiction to grant such relief, that
situation does not prevail in this state. Formerly the equity courts afforded relief
because there was no adequate remedy at law. In this jurisdiction, however, there
is an adequate remedy provided by statute under the provisions of Chapter 40 of
Title 78, U.C.A. 1953.
Id at 252. In another quiet title case, Babcock v Dangerfield, 94 P.2d 862, (Utah 1939), the
Supreme Court of Utah stated, "it is clear from the pleadings in this case that the action is one at
law and therefore that a jury trial should have been granted." (Internal Citations Omitted).
Given this case law, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim was a legal cause of
action. Therefore, they must have strictly complied with the UGIA's notice requirements or the
Court will be divested of subject matter jurisdiction to consider their claims.
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The Courtfindsthat the Plaintiffs did not provide appropriate notice, because it did not
deliver a notice of claim to the Utah Attorney General (attorney general) before filing suit.2 The
UGIA requires that a notice of claim must be sent to the entity before maintaining an action, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 and Utah Code Ann, § 63-30d-401. Additionally, a claimant must deliver
the notice of claim to both the entity and the attorney general within one year after the claim
arose. See, Utah Code Ann § 63-30-12 and Utah Code Ann § 63-30d-402. Usually, a plaintiff
would comply with these requirements by filing a notice of claim with the attorney general and
the entity within one year, and then he/she would file suit.
However, the Plaintiffs' quiet title claim muddies the time requirements for filing notice
of claim with the attorney general. The UGIA specifies that a claim arises when the statute of
limitations would begin to run against a private person. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401. Since the statute of limitations does not apply to "true quiet title
actions," such as the Plaintiffs bona fide purchaser for value claim, Nolan v Hoopiiaina fin Re
Hoopiiaina Trust), 144 P.3d 1129, 1135-38 (Utah 2006), the one year requirement does not
apply. Therefore, if a plaintiff was asserting a quiet title claim, it would have to deliver a notice
of claim to the entity before it filed suit, but there would be no deadline to deliver the notice of
claim to the attorney general's office-even though the UGIA requires that the attorney general
receive notice of claim.
This case demonstrates this problem. The Plaintiffs sent a letter to Diane McGuire, a real
estate specialist, with the Utah Department of Transportation, on March 3, 2006-before they
2

Different versions of the UGIA was passed after UDOT filed the condemnation order in January, 2003 and
before itfileda notice of interest in January, 2006. The notice requirements do not differ in material ways.
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filed. However, they did not send the notice to the attorney general's office until October 17,
2006-after they filed suit. Therefore, the attorney general was not notified as required before
this case was filed.
Because of this ambiguity in the statute, the Court looks to the intent of the statute, and it
concludes that such a plaintiff in a quiet title action must serve the attorney general before it files
suit. The UGIA clearly intends that a plaintiff send two notices-one to the entity and one to the
attorney general. Lamarr v. Utah State DOT. 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The
purpose of serving the attorney general is to ensure that the State's legal needs are met. Brittain
v. State bv & Through Utah Dep't of Employment Sec. 882 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
If there is no deadline for a plaintiff in a quiet title action to notify the attorney general, it would
contravene the statute's intent to ensure that the State's legal needs are met. Therefore, a
plaintiff in a quiet title action, must send its notice of claim to the attorney general before it files
suit. Since the Plaintiffs in this case failed to file a notice of claim with the attorney general until
after they filed suit, there claim to quiet title due to their bona fide purchaser for value statute is
dismissed without prejudice.
The Court also finds that the notice of claim that the Plaintiffs sent before they filed suit
was not sufficient, because it was not sent to the appropriate person at UDOT. The letter the
Plaintiffs sent was addressed to Diane McGuire, a real estate specialist. Under Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, service on a state agency must be made by serving any member of
its governing board, its executive employee, or its executive secretary. Since the letter Plaintiffs'
sent was not directed to any of these parties, the Plaintiffs' notice of claim was insufficient.
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Since the Plaintiffs failed to provide adequate notice of claim, the Court dismisses all of
the Plaintiffs' claims except for its claim to quiet title due to a mistake in the condemnation
order.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is denied. The motion seeks to have
UDOT's recorded documents removed under the Wrongful Lien Statutes, because they are
wrongful. As discussed infra, the UDOT's claim is not a lien or encumbrance, and at this time, it
is not clear whether UDOT's claim is wrongful. (See discussion supra Wrongful Lien Pursuant
to the Wrongful Lien Act, ^ 5). Therefore, the Court denies the motion.
Ms. Lui will prepare an order for the Court's signature.
Dated this

>H - day of June, 2007

_
W. Brent West, Judge
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FINAL ORDER OF CONDEMNATION

Civil No. 16491
EDWIN M. HIGLEY and AFTON C.
HIGLEY, his wife; KERMIT
BRIMHALL and NAYON BRIMHALL,
his wife,

:
:

Project No. I-80N-6(7)46
Parcel Nos. 49:A, 49:E, 49:2E,
49.-3E, 49:4E, 49:5E and 49:S
Total Payment: $68,928.04

Defendants
It appearing to the court and the court now finds that
heretofore, on the 4th day of January, 1974, this court made
13 GZ1

an(3e n t e r e d

^ t s judgment in the above entitled proceeding,

and said judgment is hereby referred to; and
o "«
o
5

It appearing to the court and the court now finds that
pursuant to the law and the said judgment, the plaintiff did

3D
pay said judgment to the defendants Edwin M. Higley and Afton

6 -§
5 £ C. Higley, his wife, Kermit Brimhall and Nayon Brimhall, his
> <x

= o wife, together with all interest required by said judgment to
be paid; and
It further appearing to the court that the plaintiff
has made all payments as required by law and order of this court,
and that this is not a case where any bond was required to be
given, and all and singular the law in the premises being given
by the court understood and fully considered,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
parcels of land hereinafter described are hereby taken and condemned in fee simple title as to Parcel Nos. 49:A, 49:S and for
easement rights as to Parcel Nos. 49:£, 49:2E, 49:3E, 49:4E and
49:5E, for the purpose described and set forth in the plaintiff's
complaint, i.e., for the use of the plaintiff, the State of Utah,
E* 1^034-12 8K230S PG1<S3S
for highway
purposes.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said
use is a public use and a use authorized by law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a
copy of this final order of condemnation be filed with the county
recorder of Davis County, State of Utah, and thereupon the
property interests hereinafter referred to and set forth
shall vest in fee simple title as to Parcel Nos. 49:A, 49:S
and for easement rights as to Parcel Nos. 49:E, 49:2E, 49-3E, 49:4E
and 49:5E, in the plaintiff.
the

The following is a description of

property so ordered and condemned as hereinabove provided,

which is hereby vested" in fee simple title as to Parcel No. 49:A,
49:S and for easement rights as to Parcel Nos. 49 :E, 49:2E, 49:3E
49:4E and 49:5E in the plaintiff, all of such property being
situated in Davis County, State of Utah, and is more particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:A
A parcel of land in fee for a freeway known as Project
No. 80N-6, being part of an entire tract of property, in the NE^SW%
of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B^&M. The boundaries of said
parcel of land are described as follows:
Beginning on the easterly line of the SW% of said
Section 27 at a point 90.0 ft. radially distant southerly from
the center line of the eastbound lane of said project, which
point is approximately 1491 ft. northerly from the SE. corner of
said SW%; thence Northerly 364 ft.; more or less, along said
easterly line to a point 120.0 ft. radially distant northwesterly
from the center line of the westbound lane of said project; thence
Southwesterly 516 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to
the left which is concentric with and 120.0 ft. radially distant
northwesterly from an 800.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 1°00'
curve to a point opposite Engineer Station 232+00 (Note: Tangent
to said spiral at its point of beginning bears approximately
S. 87°26« W . ) ; thence S. 75°49' W. 200.23 ft. to a point 90.0 ft.
radially distant northwesterly from the center line of said westbound lane opposite Engineer Station 230+02.50; thence Southwesterly
606 ft-," more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which
is concentric with and 90.0.ft. radially distant northwesterly from
a 1200.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 2°00' curve to a westerly boundary line of said entire tract (Note: Tangent to last said spiral
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at its point of beginning bears S. 84°21 W.); thence Southerly
236 ft., more or less, along said westerly boundary line to a
southwesterly boundary line of said entire tract; thence S. 85°08' E.
29.38 ft,; thence N. 88°53' E. 77,93 ft.; thence N. 88°45' E.
189.76 ft.; thence N. 89c56, E. 499.83 ft. to a point 90.0 ft.
radially distant southerly from the center line of said eastbound
lane opposite Engineer Station 2324-00; thence Easterly 511 ft.,
more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which is
concentric with and 90.0 ft. radially distant southerly from an
800.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 0°30* curve, (Note: Tangent
to last said spiral at its point of beginning bears N. 88°56' E.)
to the point of beginning. The above described parcel of land
contains 9.01 acres, more or less.
Together with any and all abutters rights of underlying
fee to the center of existing rights of way appurtenant to this
conveyance.
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said
Section 27 is rotated 0°15,19" clockwise to match Highway Survey
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.)
Together with any and all rights or easements appurtenant* to the remaining portion of said entire tract of property by
reason of the location thereof with reference to said freeway,
including, without limiting the foregoing, all rights of ingress
to or egress from said remaining portion, contiguous to the
lands hereby conveyed, to or from said freeway.
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:E
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property
in the NE^SW^ of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., in
Davis County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon a
cut slope and appurtenant parts thereof incident to the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6.
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows:
Beginning on the easterly line of the SW% of said Section
27 at a point 115.0 ft. radially distant southerly from the center
line of the eastbound lane of said project, which point is approximately 1471 ft. northerly from the SE. corner of said SWJj; thence
Westerly 510 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the
left which is ccncentric with and 115.0 ft. radially distant
southerly frorr. an 500.0-foot ten-chore spiral for a 0330* curve
to a point optosi'te Er.gir.eer Station 232-00 ,':»"cte: Tar.gsnt to
said spiral at its point of beginning bears X. S5C28' >»*.); thence
S. 1°04* E. 46.73 ft.; thence S. 85°08' E. 342.75 ft.; thence
N. 85°06' E. 168 ft., more or less, to the easterly line of said
SW%; thence Northerly 65 ft., more or less, along said easterly
line to" the point of beginning containing 0.75 acre, -more or
less.
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said
Section 27 is rotated 0°15f19" clockwise to match Highway Survey
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B e a r i n g s . All b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e s i n the above d e s c r i p t i o n are based on the Utah S t a t e Plane C o o r d i n a t e System.)
P a r c e l ftp. 80N-6:49:2E
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property
in the NE%SW% of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., m
Davis County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an
irrigation and utility facility and appurtenant parts thereof
incident to the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6.
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows:
Beginning at a point 90.0 ft. radially distant southerly
from the center line of the eastbound lane of said project opposite
Engineer Station 232-H30, which point is approximately 510 ft,
westerly along the southerly line of said NE^SW^ and 177 ft.
northerly along a straight line from the SE. corner of said NE%SW%;
thence S. 89°56' W. 499.83 ft.; thence S. 88°45' W. 189.76 ft.;
thence S. 88053' W. 77.93 ft.; thence S. 85o08' E. 286.43 ft.;
thence N. 89°56' E. 482.62 ft.; thence N. 1°04' W. 30.0 ft. to the
point of beginning, containing 0.43 acre, more or less.
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said
Section 27 is rotated 0°15,19,t clockwise to match Highway Survey
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.)
After irrigation and utility facility is constructed on
the above described part of an entire tract at the expense of said
State Road Commission, said State Road Commission is thereafter
relieved of any further claim or demand for costs, damages or
maintenance charges which may accrue against said irrigation and
utility facility and appurtenant parts thereof.
Parcel No. 80N~6:49;3E
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property
in the NE%SW^ of Section 27, T. 5 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., in" Davis
County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an irrigation facility and appurtenant parts thereof incident to the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6.
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows:
3ecmr.ina on the easterly line of the S*wr of said
Section 2"* at s. print <K>. 3 ft. racially distant scucherlv :rcr.
the center l;-_* c: t_-^ -> as - bo _- c ;*.-«• :f s-a:: prc;cctr --kir;i rci^:
5'«'Z7 rr.e-.ce ^sic;/,- III ft., zzzz* :r „s*s. a'.cr.; ir.s a;: :; a
spiral to zr.c l^it '*rzcr. is :c-':<-.ir;: ~ith :.r.z ?0.Z :t. rac.allv
distant scut:.*:./ fro- =r. SC2.:-;cct terser.::: spiral for s."
0*30' cur/e LC r. ?:ir.: opposite ir.7-ir.fr*r Station 232-00 :;cta:
Tangent "to said spirai at its pc:r,t zz beair.nina bears aooroximately N. 89 23' ... ) ; tnence S..1 34* £. 25.0 ft. to a point
115.0 ft. radially distant scut.ter.y from the center line of said
eastbound

lane opposite Engineer 5-aca.on 232-i-00? thence

Easterly

510 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which
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is concentric with and 115.0 ft. radially distant southerly
from an 300.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 0°30' curve to said
easterly
line of said S~l% (Note: Tangent to last said spiral
at its point of beginning bears S. 88°56' E . ) ; thence Northerly
25.0 ft., more or less, along said easterly line to the point
of beginning, containing 0.29 acre, more or less.
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said
Section 27 is rotated 0°15 , 19" clockwise to match Highway Survey
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.)
After said irrigation facility is constructed on the
above described part of an entire tract at the expense of said
State Road Commission, said State Road Commission is thereafter
relieved of any further claim or demand for costs, damages or
maintenance charges which may accrue against said irrigation
facility and appurtenant parts thereof.
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:4E
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property in
the NE*jSW% of Section 27, T. 5 N. , R. 1 W. , S.L.B.&M. , in Davis
County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an irrigations.overflow facility and appurtenant parts thereof incident to
the construction of a freeway known as Project Ho. 80N-6. Said
part of an entire tract is described as follows:
Beginning at a point 112.29 ft. radially distant northerly from the center line of the westbound lane of said project
opposite Engineer Station 231+50, which point is approximately
492 ft, northerly along the easterly line of said NE%SW% and
565 ft. westerly along a straight line from the SE. corner of
saidOTtffSVrty;thence N. 5°31' W. 77.71 ft.; thence S. 73°11« W.
25.49 ft.; thence S. 5°31' E. 76.52 ft.; thence N. 75°49' E.
25.29 ft. to the point of beginning, containing 0.04 acres, more
or less.
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the south line of said
Section 27 is rotated 0 o 15'19" clockwise to match Highway Survey
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description
are based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.)

A :c*:pcrir/ '•or':
of S 2 ; : ; r r : ^ 2 i ; : - : far:*.:

The a cove described temporary work, easement snail expire
upon the-completion of said construction.
After the irrigation overflow facility is constructed
on

the above described p a r t of an entire tract at the expense

of said State Road Commission, said State Road Commission is thereafter relieved of any further claim or demand for costs, damages
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or maintenance charges which nay accrue against said irrigation
overflow facility and appurtenant: parts thereof.
Parcel So. 8QN-6:49:5E
An easement upon part of an entire tract of property
in the NE^SW% of Section 27, T. 5 N. , R. 1 W., S.L.B.&M., in Davis
County, Utah, for the purpose of constructing thereon an irrigation overflow facility and appurtenant parts thereof incident to
the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 80N-6.
Said part of an entire tract is described as follows:
Beginning on the easterly line of the NE%SW^ of said
Section 27 at a point 120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from
the center line of the westbound lane of said project; thence
Northerly 135 ft., more or less, along said easterly line to a
northerly line of Davis County which is the center of the Weber
River; thence Westerly 17 ft., more or less, along said northerly
line of Davis County and said center of the Weber River to a point
of intersection with a radial line extending northerly from the
center line of said westbound lane opposite Engineer Station
237+00; thence S. 2°37' E. 135 ft., more or less, to a point
120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from the center line of said
westbound lane opposite Engineer Station 237+00; thence Easterly
10 ft., more or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which
is concentric with and 120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from
an 800.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 1°00' curve (Note: Tangent
to said spiral at its point of beginning bears N. 87°23' E.) to
the point of beginning, containing 0.04 acre, more or less.
ALSO:
A temporary work easement to facilitate the construction
of said irrigation facility and appurtenant parts thereof, being
upon a parcel of land 25.0 ft. wide, adjoining westerly the
westerly side line of the above described easement, containing
0.08 acre, more or less.
The above described temporary work easement shall expire
upon the completion of said construction.
(Note: GLO Survey Bearing of the South line of said
Section 27 is rotated 0 o 15'19" clockwise, to match Highway Survey
Bearings. All bearings and distances in the above description are
based on the Utah State Plane Coordinate System.)
After irrigation overflow facility is constructed on
the above describee part of ar. cr.tira tract at the e:-:per.se of
said State Road Cortrissicn. said State ?,oai Ccmnissicn is thereafter relieved of any furtr.er ciairr. or demand for costs, damages
or maintenance charges which ray accrue against said irrigation
overflow facility and appurtenant parts thereof.
Parcel No. 80N-6:49:S

A p a r c e l of land in fee, being a s e v e r e d p o r t i o n of an
e n t i r e t r a c t of p r o p e r t y lying in Davis and Weber C o u n t i e s , being

i* 1 9 0 2 5 4 - 1 2 PK23QS PG1<£4.3
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all of the NE^SW^j of Section 27, T. 3 N., R. 1 W. , S.L.E.&M.
lying north of a freeway known as Project No. I-80N-6(7)46. The
boundaries of said tract are described as follows-.
Beginning at the NE. corner of said NE^SWij; thence South
757 ft. along the east boundary line of said NE%SW% to the northerly
no-access line of said freeway; thence Westerly along said no-access
line the following three (3) courses: Southwesterly 516 ft., more
or less, along the arc of a spiral to the left which is concentric
with and 120.0 ft. radially distant northerly from an 800.0-foot
ten-chord spiral for a 1°00' curve to a point opposite Engineer
Station 2324-00 Westbound Lane (Note: Tangent to said spiral at
its point of beginning bears approximately S. 87°26< W.); thence
S. 75°49' W. 200.23 ft. to a point 90.0 ft. radially distant northwesterly from the center line of said westbound lane opposite
Engineer Station 230+02.50; thence Southwesterly 606 ft., more
or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which is concentric
with and 90.0 ft. radially distant northwesterly from a 1200.0-foot
ten-chord spiral for a 2°00' curve, to a west boundary line of said
tract of land (Note: Tangent to last said spiral at its point of
beginning bears s. 84°21' W„) ; thence North 190 ft. along said
west boundary line to the Davis and Weber County line; thence
West 25 ft. to the west line of said NE%SW%; thence North 723 ft.
along said west line to the NW. corner of said NE^SW^; thence East
1323, ft., more or less, along the north line of said NE%SW% to the
point of beginning. The above described tract of land contains 25.22
acres', more or less.
^ / <>•
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APPENDIX 7

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

otf tf

MARK KAPPOS and
MALAKAPPOS,
Plaintiffs,

DECISION
VS.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Judge:
Case:
Clerk:

w

o
o

W. Brent WestP.
060902775
"
Pamela Allen o
o
o
^O

CD

IS3

"0
ro
CD

The Defendant's Motion to Revise the Court's Order Regarding the Plaintiffs'
Constitutional Takings Claim from Without Prejudice to Prejudice is denied. This case has been
litigated piecemeal and the Court has been asked to review legal issue after legal issue without
the benefit of any evidence or testimony. Admittedly, the Court's prior Ruling on the Plaintiffs'
Constitutional Taking Claims is ambiguous. But, so were the Plaintiffs' initial pleadings. With
very little help in analysis, from the Plaintiffs in regards to their claims, the Court was left to
guess as to the Plaintiffs theories of recovery. The Court, guessing that the issue of mistake
might in some way shape or form be part of the Plaintiffs' Constitutional Taking Claim,
dismissed that claim without prejudice. It was anticipated, by the Court, that the Plaintiffs would
file an amended complaint clarifying their claim or theory of recovery. The Plaintiffs didfilean
amended complaint clarifying their Constitutional Takings Claim. The issues raised by the
Plaintiffs in their amended complaint and in their response to the Defendant's motion are
sufficient to deny the Defendant's Motion.

DECISION - DEFENDANTS MOTION TO REVISE THE O

vmnnftfifiift

Page two
Decision
Case 060902775
The Plaintiffs' counsel will please prepare an Order, consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this 26th day of October 2009.

to. fcfefe§
Judge W. Brent West
Second District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the "Z^J day of October, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Decision to the parties as follows:
M. Darin Hammond
4723 Harrison Blvd Ste 200
OgdenUt 84403
Gary D. Josephson
Assistant Attorney General
PO Box 140857
Salt Lake City Ut 84114-0857

Deputy Clerk

A PPE^DIX8

DECISjON - DEFENDANrS

VD24346982

AP,

pages: 3

060902775 STATE OF UTA DEPT OF TRANS

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK KAPPOS, and
MALA KAPPOS,
Plaintiffs,

DECISION

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
MARK KAPPOS and
MALA KAPPOS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

FILED
J U N - 9 2008
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

Judge:
Clerk:
Case:

W. Brent West
Pamela Allen
060902775

JUN-9

THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

The Defendant's Second Motion for a Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. In its
Kappos I decision, this Court ruled that a quiet title cause of action will not support a request for
damages as a matter of law. That principle applies equally as well in Kappos II Therefore, the
damage portion of the quiet title claim in Kappos His dismissed with prejudice.
A ruling on damages in this quiet title action is not premature. The legal principle is
constant and is not dependent upon the filing of an appropriate notice of claim. Failure to file a
notice of claim for damages is not the reason the damage claim was dismissed in Kappos II It

Page two
Decision
Case 060902775
was dismissed because damages are simply not available in a traditional quiet title claim.
In addition, immunityfromthe Plaintiffs damage claim has not been waived by the
Defendant. The logic of Tindlev v Salt Lake City School District 116 P.3d 295 (Utah 2005) is
dispositive. The Defendant, by recording it's notice of interest, was engaged in a governmental
function.
The Defendant has not waived its immunity for damages in a quiet title action, which
damages couldn't be awarded anyway. The takings provision does not apply because the Plaintiff
has not alleged a constitutional cause of action and finally, the general waiver for employee
negligence does not apply in this instance.
Defense counsel will please prepare an Order, consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this 6th day of June, 2008.

Judge W. Brent West
Second District Court

Page two
Decision
Case 060902775

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the M "" day of June, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Decision to the parties as follows:
REED STRINGHAM
GARYJOSEPHSON
PO BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856
M DARIN HAMMOND
4723 HARRISON BLVD STE 200
OGDENUT 84403

APPENDIX 9

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
Section
63-30d-9(H-

Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
63-30d-l01* Title, scope, and intent.
(1) Thi s chapter is known as the "Governmental Immunity
Act of Uf^'"
(2) (a) '^ne waivers and retentions of immunity found in
this chapter apply to all functions of government, no
matfer how labeled.
(bj This single, comprehensive chapter governs all
claiii18 against governmental entities or against their
em p}oyees or agents arising out of the performance of the
empJ°yee,s duties, within the} scope of employment, or
undtfr c0*01" °f authority.
2004
63-30d-l 02 ' Definitions.
As u s e d in this chapter:
(Ij "Claim" means any asserted demand for or cause of
actio11 *°r money or damages, whether arising under the
common law, under state constitutional provisions, or
xm&0T state statutes, against a governmental entity or
against an employee in the employee's personal capacity.
(2) (a) "Employee* includes:
(i) a governmental entity's officers, employees,
servants, trustees, or commissioners;
\i\> mem\>eYs oi a governing \>ony*,
(iii) members of a government entity board;
(iv) members of a government entity commission;
(v) members of an advisory body, officers, and
employees of a Children's Justice Center created
in accordance with Section 67-5b-104;
(vi) student teachers holding a letter of authorization in accordance with Sections 53A-6-103
and 53A-6-104;
(vii) educational aides;
(viii) students engaged in providing services to
members of the public in the course of an approved ^medical, nursing, or other professional
health care clinical training program;
(ix) volunteers as denned by Subsection 67-202(3); and
(x) tutors.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(c) "Employee" does not include an independent
contractor.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its
political subdivisions as both are defined in this section.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means each activity,
undertaking, or operation of a governmental entity.
(b) "Governmental function" includes each activity,
undertaking, or operation performed by a department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(c) "Governmental function" includes a governmental entity's failure to act.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to
o r loss of property, or any other injury that a person may
suffer to his person or estate, that would be actionable if
inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) Tersonal injury" means an injury of any kind other
thaU property damage.

900

(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town,
district, public transit district, redevelopment
a g e n c y , special improvement or taxing district, special
district an entity created by an interlocal agreement
adopted! under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooper*
fcon Act, or other governmental subdivision or public
corp^ r a ^ o n (8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any
righk title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(91 "State" means the state of Utah, and includes each
office department, division, agency, authority, commission* board, institution, hospital, college, university, Children's Justice Center, or other instrumentality of the
statf(]0) "Willful misconduct" means the intentional doing
of a wrongful act, or the wrongful failure to act, without
just cause or excuse, where the actor is aware that his
conduct will probably result in injury.
2004
scn0()l

PART 2
( ^ V E R N M E N T A L IMMUNITY — STATEMENT,
SCOPE, AND EFFECT
63-30d-^®I* I m m u n i t y o f g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s from
suit.
(1) Except as m a v te otherwise provided in this chapter,
each g o V e m m e n t a l entity and each employee of a governmental entity a r e hnmune from suit for any injury that results
from thtf exercise of a governmental function.
(2) N^ t w ^^ n s t a n a ^ n 6 the w a i v e r of immunity provisions of
Section 63-30d-301, a governmental entity, its officers, and its
employe e s a r e immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting fr°m t n e implementation of or the failure to implement m ^ ^ e s to:
(#) control the causes of epidemic and communicable
diseases and other conditions significantly affecting the
public health or necessary to protect the public health as
s e t out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Departments;
(p) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and
d i s £ a s e a s set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of
Public Health Emergencies Act; and
(<•) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a
public health emergency as defined in Section 26-23b~102,
o r 0. declaration by the President of the United States or
oth#r federal official requesting public health related
activities.
2004
63-30d-202. Act provisions not construed as admission
or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of
immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of
employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as an admission or
d e n ial of liability or responsibility by or for a governmental entity or its employees.
(p) YL immunity from suft is waived. \)y t m s dnapter,
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
* (c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict
liafculty or absolute liability.
(2) N 0 t n m £ m this chapter may be construed as adversely
affecting ^ y immunity from suit that a governmental entity
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), an action
under this chapter against a governmental entity for an
injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the

(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity
waived:
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain pos£*
sion of, or quiet title to real or personal property;
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgage,3
other Hens on real or personal property, to determine P1
adverse claim on teal or ^er^oual^mjier^ot to obtain *
adjudication about any mortgage or other Hen that ^
(c) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any civil ac^ 10n
governmental entity may have or claim'on rfeal or P*
• or proceeding based upon the same subject matter aga* nst
sonal property,
the employee or the estate of the employee whose ac* o r
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destrucf^0
omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
u n
damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or other prop01"
(i) the employee acted or failed to act thro &
while it is in the possession of any governmental entity (
fraud or willful misconduct;
em
employee, if the property was seized for the purpo$ e
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the ~
forfeiture under any provision of state law;
ployee driving a vehicle, or being in actual phy^ ca *
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(l), as to any a
control of a vehicle:
or
tion brought under the authority ofArticle I, Section 22, <
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal iP
the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compens^ 0
greater by weight than the established le&al
from the governmental entity when the governmtf11^
limit;
an r
entity has taken or damaged private property for p ^ 1
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or 5
uses without just compensation;
drug to a degree that rendered the person inca(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any a<*io
pable of safely driving the vehicle; or
brought
to recover attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2"40
(C) while under the combined influence of *!•
and 63-2-802;
cohol and any drug to a degree that rendered ^ n e
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, tJtal
person incapable of safely driving the vehicle
Protection of Public Employees Act; or
(hi) injury or damage resulted from the empl0 vee
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a k m
being physically or mentally impaired so as tP D e
use regulation that imposes a substantial burden or> th<
unable to reasonably perform his or her job runtf*1011
free exercise of religion under Title 63, Chapter 90b, t-Jtal
because of:
Religious Land Use Act.
(A) the use of alcohol;
j[3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immiP11^
(B) the nonprescribed use of a controlled £UD~
from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to a n 5
stance as defined in. Section 58-37-4*, or
a
injury caused by:
(C) the combined influence of alcohol aP&
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditio11 °^
nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by
any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side^ a ^j
Section 58-37-4; or ,
ne
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure
<iv) in a judicial o r administrative proceeding* ^
located on them; or
employee intentionally or knowingly gave, up^ n a
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public
lawful oath or in any form allowed by law && a
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
substitute for an oath, false testimony m a t e r i a l ^ t n e
improvement,
issue or matter of inquiry under this section.
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out °f>m
(4) Except as permitted in Subsection (3Xc), no employee
connection with, or results from:
may be joined or held personally liable for acts or omis0*ons
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition
occurring:
of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side(a) during the performance of the employee's duti es J
walk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other gtinc(b) within the scope of employment; or
2004
ture located on them; or
(c) under color of authority.
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition
63-30d-203. Exemptions for certain takings actionsof
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or
An action that involves takings law, as defined in Se^^ o n
other public improvement.
€3-84-13r is not subject to the requirements .of Section^ 63(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
2004
30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, and 63-30d-6Ql.
waived as to any injury proximately caused by a neglige*** a c *
or omission of an employee committed within the scop6 0I"
employment.
PART 3
(5) Immunity is not waived under Subsections (3) and W) if
WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exer63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity -*- Exceptions.
cise or perform, a discretionary function, whether o** n o *
is
<(1) (a) Immunity'from suit of each governmental entity
the discretion is abused;
waived as to any contractual obligation.
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ajrest,
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligamalicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse ci protions are not subject to the requirements of Sections
cess, libel, slander, deceit, interference with coflfr^t
63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601.
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of cfrU
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for
rights;
failure to deliver water from a reservoir or a s s o r t e d
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation °£ o r
facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear # i v e r
by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke,
Development Act, if the failure to deliver the c o n t r a ^ ^ 1
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, Or &&&&*
amount of water is due to drought, other natural condiauthorization;
tion, or-safety condition that causes a deficiency in * n e
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making a n
amount of available water.
inadequate or negligent inspection;
performance of an employee's duties, within the scop£ °*
employment, or under color of authority is a piainti**s
exclusive remedy.
(b) Judgment under this chapter against a governmen~
tal entity is a complete bar to1 any action by the claims1**
based upon the same subject matter, against the emplo vee
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PART 4
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without
NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL
probable cause;
ENTITY OR A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not
it is negligent or intentional;
63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents —
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of
mob violence, jand civil disturbances;
guardian ad litem.
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (1Kb), a claim
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
the claim were against a private person begins to ^rutn,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or conuntil a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable
trolled lands, any condition existing in connection with an
diligence should have known:
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the govauthorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands
ernmental entity or its employee; and
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the
Lands;
name of the employee.
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable
seeding for the clearing of fog;
diligence is upon the claimant.
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental
natural disasters;
entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
storm systems;
scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section action, regardless ofwhether or not the function giving rise to
the claim is characterized as governmental.
41-6a-208;
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(p) the activities of:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
they are known; and
materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a govern(iv) emergency evacuations;
mental employee individually as provided in Subsec(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a
tion 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of the employee,
place where emergency medical assistance can be
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
rendered or where the person can be transported by a
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
licensed ambulance service; or
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
and
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exer(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail
cise or perform, any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapaccording to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to
ter 10, Board of Water Resources — Division of Water
the office of
Resources; or
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or
against an incorporated city or town;
electronic information systems by any person or entity.
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against
2005
a county;
63-30d-302. Specific remedies — "Takings" actions —(C) the superintendent or business adminisGovernment Records Access and Managetrator of the board, when the claim is against a
ment Actions.
school district or board of education;
(1) In any action brought under the authority of Article I,
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution for the recovery of
the board, when the claim is against a special
compensation from the governmental entity when the governdistrict;
,
mental entity has taken or damaged private property for
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
public uses without just compensation, compensation and
against the State of Utah;
damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of
(F) a member of the governing board, the
Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
executive director, or executive secretary, when
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Section 63-30d-401, a notice of
the claim is against any other public board,
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 63-30dcommission, or body; or
301(2Xe) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental
for review under Section 63-2-404.
entity to receive the notice of claim by the gov(b) The provisions of Subsection 63-30d-403(l), relaternmental entity under Subsection (5Xe).
ing to the governmental entity's response to a claim, and
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to
the provisions of 63-30d-601, requiring an undertaking,
result in a claim against a governmental entity is susdo not apply to a notice of claim for attorneys' fees filed
tained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or
contemporaneously with a petition for review under Secmentally incompetent, that governmental entity may file
tion 63-2-404.
a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to
ad litem for the potential claimant.
a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 63-30d(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for
301(2Xe) may be brought contemporaneously with the
filing a claim under Section 63-30d-402 begins when the
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 2004
order appointing the guardian is issued.

APPENDIX l

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MAR 012010

MARK KAPPOS and MALA KAPPOS,
Plaintiffs,

DECISION
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Judge:
Clerk:
Case:

W. Brent Wegt_
Pamela Allen
060902775

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

The Plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint or to Reinstate their Claim for a
Constitutional Taking is denied. First, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs in that their motion is
timely. However, the Court finds the case of Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284,495 P.2d 809
(1972) dispositive on the procedural merits. An order of dismissal is a final adjudication and
thereafter a complaint cannot be amended. Although these claims were dismissed, without
prejudice, they were dismissed. This case is otherwise completed. Although the Plaintiffs'
argument about judicial economy makes a great deal of sense, it appears that their remedy is to
file a new complaint, if they desire to proceed on this claim.
Counsel for the State of Utah will please prepare a short Order, consistent with this
ruling.

060902775 STATE OF UTA DEPT OF

Page two
Decision
Case 060902775
Kappos vs State of Utah

Dated this 25th day of February 2010.

Judge W. Brent West
Second District Court
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